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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was the Court below correct in its holding 
that the appellants1 alleged cause of action, which 
according to the undisputed facts arose in 1973, was barred 
by the provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act? 
2. Is the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, and 
the statute of limitations associated therewith, constitutional? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a suit initiated by appellants 
(plaintiffs) on or about October 8, 1985, alleging medical 
malpractice against respondents (defendants). Plaintiffs claim 
that the defendants committed malpractice more than twelve 
years prior to the date the action was filed, but alleged that 
the statute of limitations should be tolled because of the 
provision in the Utah Health Care Malpiractice Act which 
provides that if a health care provider affirmatively acts to 
fraudulently conceal alleged misconduct/ the running of the 
statute is tolled until such time as the plaintiff knew or 
should have known of the alleged misconduct. 
On or about December 16, 1985, defendant Garth 
Myer, M.D., filed a motion to dismiss which was subsequently 
treated by the lower court as a motion for summary judgment. 
On or about December 17, 1985, defendants L. George Veasy, 
M.D., Karen Bowman, R.N., and the hospital defendants moved for 
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summary judgment and dismissal. These motions were all heard 
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on February 5, 1986. 
At that hearing, argument was heard from the 
respective counsel. Counsel for defendants argued that 
plaintiffs' cause of action could not be sustained under the 
statute of limitations provision of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act. Plaintiffs argued that the statute of 
limitations should be tolled. After hearing the arguments, the 
matter was taken under advisement by Judge Wilkinson who 
later granted defendants' motions for summary judgment and 
dismissal. Plaintiffs' appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Jennifer Chapman was born on August 10, 1972, and 
was treated for "blue spells" by doctors in Ogden for the 
first five to seven months of her life. She was then 
referred to the Primary Children's Medical Center and was 
admitted by defendant L. George Veasy, M.D. (R. 8-9; A. 2.) 
On or about February 14, 1973, an operation was 
performed by a doctor who was not a named defendant to install 
a "Waterston Shunt." The purpose of that operation was to 
increase the flow of blood to Jennifer's lungs. The operation 
"over-corrected" the initial problem and on February 28, 
1973, a second operation was performed to modify the shunt. 
(R. 9; A. 2-3.) 
Although the second operation was successful, 
Jennifer suffered a cardiac arrest a few hours after the 
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operation. Resuscitative efforts saved Jennifer's life, but it 
was determined immediately thereafter that she had sustained 
severe and irreversible brain damage. Defendant Garth Myer, 
M.D., first became acquainted with Jennifer and her family the 
day following the cardiac arrest, and had no involvement 
whatsoever in either the shunt operations or in any treatment 
before or during the time the brain damage occurred. 
In the months and years following Jennifer's cardiac 
arrest in 1973, her parents (plaintiffs) had several 
discussions and considerable correspondence with defendant 
Veasy. On several of those occasions, they alleged that 
medical negligence during her hospital stay at the Primary 
Children's Medical Center in February of 1973, caused her 
condition. These facts are supported by the affidavit of Dr. 
Veasy and were not disputed by plaintiff in either the 
court below or in their Appellant's Brief filed in this Court. 
(A. 3; A. 7-8.) 
Between November of 1977 and July of 1985, plaintiffs 
conferred with at least five different attorneys before finding 
their present counsel became involved. None of the 
above-mentioned attorneys filed suit or notices of intent to 
commence a malpractice action. (A. 8-9.) After plaintiffs' 
present counsel filed suit, counsel for defendants moved for 
summary judgment alleging, among other things, that plaintiffs' 
alleged causes of action were barred by the applicable statute 
of limitations contained in the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
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Act. The Court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor 
of all defendants. 
SUMMARY 
Defendant Myers argues herein that he was not 
involved in the alleged acts of negligence which plaintiffs 
claim constitute the basis for their cause of action. 
Defendant Myer was not involved in either of the operations 
preceding Jennifer Chapman's coronary arrest, nor in the 
resuscitative efforts following that coronary arrest. Indeed, 
he did not become involved until the day after the coronary 
arrest, after the brain damage suffered by Jennifer had already 
been done. 
Defendant further points out that clear and 
convincing evidence exits that plaintiffs had considerable 
correspondence with defendant Veasy in the months and years 
following Jennifer's coronary arrest. As testified to by Dr. 
Veasy, the plaintiffs indicated to him that they felt 
negligence on the part of the hospital and its staff was a 
cause of Jennifer's brain damage. Therefore, it is clear that 
the plaintiffs did have notice of a possibility of a lawsuit 
and the possibility of negligence on the part of hospital 
employees, and cannot now claim that they were not aware of 
facts to support the possibility of a lawsuit. 
Defendant has also argued herein that although 
plaintiffs have alleged that "defendants" acted to fraudulent 
conceal information they needed to know of to initiate a 
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lawsuit, they have only offered facts that tend to show they 
spoke with one single defendant — Dr. Veasy. There are 
absolutely no factual allegations whatsoever to support a claim 
that defendant Myers did or said anything that could be 
construed to be fraudulent concealment. As discussed herein, 
Utah courts have consistently held that in any action based on 
fraud, the substance of the acts constituting the fraud must be 
stated with particularity. In this action, plaintiffs have not 
suggested even one act committed by defendant Myer that might 
have been fraudulent concealment. In short, plaintiffs have 
not supported a factual basis to support such a claim against 
defendant Myer. 
Finally, it is alleged herein that the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act and its statute of limitations do not 
violate constitutional protections. The cases that have 
addressed this issue have clearly held that the act does not 
deny rights protected by the equal protection clause of the 
Constitution, nor does it unconstitutionally deprive minor 
plaintiffs of access to the courts. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT MYER DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN EITHER THE ALLEGED 
NEGLIGENT ACTS OR THE FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT CLAIMED 
BY PLAINTIFFS |. 
In the present action, plaintiffs have claimed that 
negligence on the part of the defendant hospital and its 
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staff caused the brain damage suffered by Jennifer Chapman. 
Plaintiffs claim that a heart-monitoring machine 
malfunctioned or was improperly read in the hospital at the 
time that Jennifer Chapman suffered a coronary arrest. 
Plaintiffs allege that the delay in providing proper 
resuscitative measures led to a lack of oxygen which 
subsequently caused permanent brain damage. 
Defendant Myer stresses to this Court that he was 
not involved in either of the shunt operations, or with any of 
the treatment or supervision at the time that Jennifer 
Chapman suffered her coronary arrest. Defendant did not even 
become involved in this matter until the day following Jennifer 
Chapman's coronary arrest. By that time, the severe and 
irreparable brain damage claimed by plaintiffs had already been 
done. Dr. Myer only treated Jennifer following the 
discovery that she had apparently suffered the above-mentioned 
damage. Although this fact was stressed to the Court by 
defendant Myer in a motion for summary disposition, 
plaintiffs filed a response to that motion alleging that Dr. 
Myer may still somehow be liable. 
In their Appellants' Brief, plaintiffs have alleged 
that "defendants misrepresented the cause of the plaintiffs' 
injuries and the plaintiffs' family did not know of Jennifer 
Chapman's 'legal injury' until July of 1984, and the statute 
of limitations did not commence running until that time." 
(Appellants' Brief at p. 14.) This defendant asks the Court to 
carefully review the pages following this allegation and to 
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also review those affidavits submitted as support for 
appellants1 brief. On page 15, plaintiffs allege that they: 
Had been told by the defendants that the 
injuries were caused by blood clots and 
unavoidable injury which was surely, in the 
eyes of the Chapmans, an act tantamount 
to an act of God. They were further 
falsely told that the hospital records and 
'tests1 confirmed these facts, and that Dr. 
Veasy 'knew for a fact' that the blood 
clots had caused her injury. 
(pp. 15-16.) 
However, the affidavit signed by Teresa Chapman 
herself clearly states: 
I believed that Dr. Veasy, the head of 
cardiology at the defendant hospital, spoke 
for the hospital as well as himself during 
our meetings with him. He represented to 
my husband and I that there were tests and 
records which indicated that the cause of 
our daughter's injuries was a blood clot or 
shower of blood clots that flooded her 
brain and that he 'knew for a fact' that 
the blood clots had caused her injury. In 
addition, he said that this event was 
unavoidable and had nothing to do with any 
negligence on the part of anyone. 
Plaintiff further stated in her affidavit as follows: 
These [hospital] records were therefore in 
direct conflict with the statements of Dr. 
Veasy to us. 
In July of 1984, my husband and I 
confronted Dr. Veasy about the medical 
records and their conflict with his 
previous statements to us. He replied that 
the true cause of Jennifer's injuries had 
never been established and he admitted that 
his prior statements to us on this subject 
were assumptions on his part and not the 
result of tests which had been performed on 
Jennifer. 
As can be clearly seen, the only support which 
plaintiffs claim as a basis for their Allegations that 
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information was fraudulently concealed are alleged statements 
made by Dr. Veasy. Nowhere, either in the affidavits 
submitted by plaintiffs or in the memoranda filed with the 
lower court and this court, do plaintiffs offer any factual 
basis whatsoever as support for their allegation that defendant 
Myer had anything to do with the alleged "fraudulent 
concealment." However, even though plaintiffs themselves admit 
that only defendant Veasy made the statements they allege to 
be "fraudulent concealment," they nonetheless continue to state 
that: 
Respondents informed Teresa and Robert 
Chapman that hospital records and tests 
indicated that Jennifer's brain damage was 
due to unavoidable blood clots and could 
not be attributed to the negligence of 
anyone. 
(Appellants1 Docketing Statement, p. 4.) In short, there was 
absolutely no proof whatsoever before the Court below that 
defendant Myer did or said anything that could be construed 
as fraudulent concealment. Indeed, no evidence exits before 
this Court that such is the case. Plaintiffs cannot now, for 
the first time, allege for the purposes of this appeal that 
defendant Myer did indeed do something that might be 
construed as concealment. 
The "fraudulent concealment" exception to the statute 
of limitations provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act clearly states as follows: 
In an action where it is alleged that a 
patient has been prevented from discovering 
misconduct on the part of a health care 
provider because that health care provider 
has affirmatively acted to fraudulently 
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conceal the alleged misconduct, the claims 
shall be barred unless commenced within one 
year after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable 
diligence should have discovered the 
fraudulent concealment, whichever first 
occurs. 
(U.C.A. §78-14-4(1)(b.) As can clearly be seen by this 
statute, it is not enough that a health care provider 
affirmatively acts to conceal misconduct. The statute requires 
that the patient be prevented from discovering misconduct on 
the part of a health care provider "because that health care 
provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal 
• . . ." As mentioned above, in the present action, the only 
claims made by plaintiffs, and the only evidence and factual 
allegations submitted to support such claims, indicate that the 
only statements made which could possibly be construed as 
"fraudulent concealment" were made by defendant Veasy, not by 
defendant Myer. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS CANNOT CLAIM FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT IN THIS ACTION. 
Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, clearly 
states that "in all averments of fraud or mistake, the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated 
with particularity." (Emphasis added.) The Utah Supreme Court 
has interpreted this rule on several occasions. First, 
plaintiffs cannot assert that the requirement of Rule 9(b) does 
not apply to this action. In the case of Williams v. State 
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Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme 
Court addressed the above-cited rule and held as follows: 
"Fraud" or "fraudulent" are terms of 
uncertain meaning. They are conclusions 
that must be flushed out by elaboration and 
by consideration of the context in which 
they are used. This is why Rule 9(b) 
requires that the circumstances 
constituting fraud "shall be stated with 
particularity" a requirement we have 
construed to require allegation of the 
substance of the acts constituting the 
alleged wrong. The Rule 9(b) requirement 
should not be understood as limited to 
allegations of common-law fraud. The 
purpose of that requirement dictates that 
it reach all circumstances where the 
pleader alleges the kind of 
misrepresentations, omissions, or other 
deceptions covered by the term "fraud" in 
its broadest dimension. Consequently, if 
the pleading had merely alleged that the 
insured had given "fraudulent" or 
"deceptive" or "misrepresenting" answers, 
it would have been insufficient* 
Id. at 972 (emphasis added.) In the present action, it is 
clear that Rule 9(b) applies. 
This Court has also set forth other requirements for 
cases containing allegations of fraudulent conduct. In Pace 
v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952), the court 
held that the "essential elements" of an action based on 
fraudulent misrepresentations were: 
(1) That a representation was made; (2) 
Concerning a presently existing material 
fact; (3) Which was false; (4) Which the 
representer either (a) knew to be false or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base 
such representation; (5) For the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; 
(6) That the other party, acting reasonably 
and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) Did in 
fact rely upon it; (8) And was thereby 
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induced to act; (9) To his injury and 
damage. 
(Id. at 274-75). 
In Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266, 372 P.2d 
990 (1962), the Court added to this when it held: 
It is to be noted that the tjerms 'fraud,' 
'conspiracy1 and 'negligence1 are but 
general accusations in the nature of 
conclusions of the pleader. They will not 
stand up against a motion to dismiss on 
that ground. Basic facts must be set 
forth with sufficient particularity to show 
what facts are claimed to constitute such 
charges. 
Id. at 991. (Emphasis added.) 
In the present action, plaintiffs did not claim the 
necessary elements of fraud. Even if their general allegations 
of "fraudulent concealment" could somehow be construed to 
fulfill that requirement, none of the documents filed with the 
Court meets the requirement that the "substance of the acts" be 
set forth with sufficient particularity to show what facts are 
claimed to constitute and support the allegations made. 
Although the above-discussed deficiencies are true 
as to all defendants, defendant Myer a^ain stresses that they 
are especially true as to him. No actp are set forth, and no 
facts whatsoever are given to support plaintiffs' claim that 
defendant Myer participated in fraudulent concealment. 
Although plaintiffs attempt to use a catch-all that "the 
defendants fraudulently concealed information," that claim is 
not made specifically to defendant Myer and no facts 
whatsoever are given to support such an allegation as to him. 
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Therefore, the lower court's granting of defendant Myer's 
motion to dismiss was completely proper. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS HAD ADEQUATE NOTICE OF THEIR POTENTIAL CLAIM. 
Attached to this brief is a copy of a letter from 
plaintiff Robert Chapman to defendant Veasy. In that 
letter, plaintiff acknowledges that "I am not seeking to 
destroy any doctors or put a hospital out of business." Mr. 
Chapman then continues as follows: 
Now I am well aware that I am not qualified 
medically or legally to answer all of the 
questions pertaining to a malpractice 
suite[sic]. The way I understand the law, 
the burden of proof is on me to prove both 
negligence and physical damage. The 
negligence is obvious but to what extent 
the physical damage can be linked to this 
negligence, only a man of your medical 
knowledge can know for sure. I do know 
that besides being mentally and physically 
handicaped[sic], Jennifer also has an 
enlarged heart making it impossible for her 
to ever lead any kind of normal active life 
and eventually will be the cause of her 
death. She was hurt and hurt bad because 
of wrong decisions made in her early life. 
(A. 17-18.) 
This letter, written in 1977, clearly indicates that 
Mr. Chapman felt at that time that the cause of his 
daughter's handicaps was certain acts of negligence in her 
early life. In the affidavits submitted by the plaintiffs, 
they further stated: 
About ten to fifteen minutes after leaving 
Jennifer's room, I returned to visit her 
again. Several nurses were in the room. 
Jennifer looked peculiar to me but I 
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believed the nurses were on top of the 
situation since they were standing with me 
by her bedside observing her. One of the 
nurses was working with the heart 
monitoring machine which was attached to 
Jennifer. The entire time I was in the 
room, the nurse kept figiting with the 
electrode leads on Jennifer's chest. After 
ten to fifteen minutes had passed, the 
nurse told me that an alarm on the heart 
monitor machine was sounding. She told me 
that the machine was not set properly and 
that she would have to get someone to help 
her set it. Before she left the room, I 
asked her whether the anesthetic was making 
Jennifer look peculiar. She then examined 
Jennifer and told me that Jennifer was in 
cardiac arrest. At that point, she 
signaled for help and other doctors and 
nurses arrived shortly. 
(A. 21.) It is clear that the plaintiffs felt something was 
wrong at the time of the alleged negligence by the hospital and 
its personnel. As stated by the attached exhibit of defendant 
Veasy, the plaintiffs had "many discussions and considerable 
correspondence" with him during the months and years 
immediately following the episode in 1973 which left her 
impaired. Dr. Veasy further testified that "on several 
occasions they have alleged that medical negligence during her 
hospitalization at Primary Children's Medical Center in 
February of 1973, caused Jennifer's impaired condition." (A. 
7.) 
Thus, from the facts of the case, the plaintiffs' own 
admissions and the affidavit filed by defendant Veasy, it is 
clear that plaintiffs were well aware of the facts which they 
finally relied on in 1984, as a basis for their suit. 
Defendant calls the Court's attention to the case of Reiser 
v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1981), in which the plaintiff, 
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as the plaintiffs in this action have done, claimed that he was 
not aware of the "legal injury" until after the statute of 
limitations had run. The court, however, held as follows: 
Mr. Riser filed an affidavit wherein he 
asserted a belief that his wife's disorders 
were temporary and that he did not become 
aware of any permanent damage until June, 
1972. Such declaration of his belief was 
not sufficient to raise an issue of fact. 
Furthermore, the very acknowledgement that 
his wife was suffering disorders as a 
result of the incident (whether temporary 
or permanent) would show that plaintiffs 
should have known that they had suffered 
legal injury at the time of the cardiac 
arrest. 
Id. at 100 (Emphasis added). In the present action, such is 
the exact case. The plaintiffs1 affidavits acknowledge that 
there was something "peculiar" before it was realized that 
their daughter was in cardiac arrest, and further acknowledged 
that they were informed of and knew that she had suffered a 
cardiac arrest and had also suffered permanent and irreversible 
brain damage. That knowledge was had by plaintiffs 
immediately after their daughter's cardiac arrest in 1973. 
Therefore, the plaintiffs' cause of action in this case is 
barred under the clear provisions of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act. 
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POINT IV 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE ERRED IN CLAIMING THAT THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS WAS TOLLED BY ESTOPPEL AND A CONTINUING 
PHYSICIAN/PATIENT RELATIONSHIP. 
On page 18 of their Appellants1 Brief, plaintiffs 
have stated that under the doctrine of estoppel, defendants 
should be "estopped from asserting the statute of 
limitations as a defense." Such a claim is completely 
unsupported by either statute or case law. By making such an 
allegation, plaintiffs attempt to skirt the clear provisions of 
the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. That Act already 
provides that: 
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a 
patient has been prevented from discovering 
misconduct on the part of a health care 
provider because that health care provider 
has affirmatively acted to fraudulently 
conceal the alleged misconduct, the claims 
shall be barred unless commenced within one 
year after the plaintiff or patient 
discovers, or through the use of reasonable 
diligence should have discovered the 
fraudulent concealment, whichever first 
occurs. 
The above-cited statute fully incorporates the elements of 
estoppel and takes into account that if there is fraudulent 
concealment, the plaintiff has obviously relied on the acts of 
the defendant to his or her detriment. 
In their Appellants1 Brief, plaintiffs have cited to 
the case of Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 
456 P.2d 159 (1969), for the proposition that "a defendant is 
estopped from pleading the statute of limitations where the 
defendant has concealed the existence Of material facts which 
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would put the plaintiff on notice of a cause of action.11 
Plaintiffs completely err in asserting that the facts of Rice 
apply to the present matter. In the Rice case, an insurance 
adjuster for the defendant had contacted the plaintiff and 
"advised her that she would be compensated for her damages as 
soon as the costs thereof were ascertained." The court also 
noted that "she was reassured that the insurance company would 
accept responsibility and that she was not to worry." Id. at 
161. 
The court further explained that "the question of 
whether negotiations for the compromise of a claim or debt will 
give rise to an estoppel against pleading the statute of 
limitations depends upon the character of the negotiations and 
the circumstances surrounding the parties." Id. at 163. The 
court then cited to the case of North v. Culmer, 193 So. 2d 
701 (Fla.App. 1967), where a court had held that "acts or 
conduct which wrongfully induce a party to believe an amicable 
adjustment of his claim will be made may create an estoppel 
against pleading the statute of limitations." Id. 
In the present action, there was obviously no 
"admission of liability" or "assurance that the defendants 
would accept responsibility." To the contrary, plaintiffs1 own 
affidavits indicate that defendant Veasy informed them that 
he did not feel their daughter's injuries were the result of 
anyone's negligence. The clear provisions of the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act supersede any general notions of estoppel 
and are clearly controlling in this case. The statute of 
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limitations in that Act clearly encompasses any and all 
elements of estoppel that could be claimed by plaintiffs in 
this action. 
The plaintiffs also err in claiming that the statute 
of limitations is tolled during a continuing relationship 
between a patient and a physician. Defendant Myer is unclear 
whether this argument of plaintiffs applies to him since 
plaintiffs, in their appellants' brief, have only stated that 
"since it was uncontested that . . . the Chapmans maintained 
physician/patient relationships with Dr. Veasy and the 
hospital until March or April, 1985, this fact should have been 
dispositive below since the statute of limitations under such 
circumstances would not begin to run until March or April, 
1985. . . . " Because the physician/patient relationship 
between defendant Myer and the Chapmans terminated much 
earlier than the dates mentioned, defendant Myer assumes that 
this argument does not apply to him. however, to the extent 
that plaintiffs might argue it does apply, defendant Myers 
offers the following. 
As support for plaintiffs' novel suggestion regarding 
the tolling of a statute by a continuing physician/patient 
relationship, plaintiffs have cited the case of Pateler v. 
Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d 244 (193?). Although the 
Pateler case does discuss the effect of a continuing 
patient/physician relationship, plaintiffs have misstated the 
applicability of that case to the present action. In 
Pateler, the court specifically noted: 
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From the time he undertook to treat the 
case until he ceased to treat it, he, as 
alleged, did so in a negligent and 
unskillful manner. As alleged, the 
treatments were not separate and distinct 
acts, separate and distinct causes of 
action. They constituted an entire course 
of treatment of a case undertaken by 
defendant to be treated by him, and the 
whole thereof constituted but one cause of 
action. 
Id. at 249. As mentioned above, defendant Myer had 
absolutely nothing to do with the operations or actions 
preceding or during Jennifer Chapman's coronary arrest. His 
actions were completely "separate and distinct acts" and cannot 
be considered with the acts of other defendants to form "one 
cause of action." 
Defendant must strenuously object to plaintiffs1 
claim that "tolling the statute of limitations during the 
existence of this fiduciary relationship is in line with the 
majority of jurisdictions . . . ." Plaintiffs have cited 61 
Am.Jur. 2d Physicians and Surgeons, §185, p. 312. 
However, that annotation deals only with implied consent either 
expressed or implied, and has nothing whatsoever to do with the 
tolling of the statute of limitation by the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship. To the contrary, many cases have held 
that such continuing treatment does not toll the statute of 
limitations. See, 80 A.L.R. 2d 368, 385 and supplement 
thereto. In any event, the principle suggested by plaintiffs 
cannot apply where a plaintiff either discovers, or through 
the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the 
injury and voluntarily continues to be treated by the physician 
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in question. Furthermore, it is clear that this principle does 
not apply to defendant Myer because the "continuing 
relationship" principle only applies when the doctor who 
continues the treatment was the one whc^  originally committed 
acts of negligence. As mentioned above, defendant Myer had 
nothing to do with the alleged acts of negligence which 
plaintiffs claim formed the basis for their cause of action in 
this case. 
POINT V 
THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT AND ITS 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DO NOT VIOLATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTIONS. 
A. Utah Code Ann. Section 78-14-4(2) does not deny 
rights protected by the equal protection clause of the 
Constitution. 
Appellants in this action argue that the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations is unconstitutional as 
applied to minors. In making this argument, the appellants 
rely almost exclusively on the case of Scott v. School Board 
of Granite School District, 568 P.2d 7^ 6 (Utah 1977). While 
the appellants admit that in response to the Scott decision, 
the Utah Legislature amended the language of Section 
78-14-4(2), they continue to argue that the amendment was to no 
avail and that the statute should still be found 
unconstitutional today. This argument has been summarily 
rejected by courts, including the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah. In Harqett v. Limberq, 598 F. 
Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984), the District Court stated that: 
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The legislative history of this language 
(Utah Code Ann. Section 78-14-4(2)) 
indicates that it was added as an amendment 
in direct response to the Utah court's 
pronouncement in Scott of the general 
policy favoring protection of the causes of 
minors. In view of the express language of 
the statute and the legislative history, 
plaintiffs' argument that Mrs. Hargett's 
discovery of the legal injury does not bar 
Nathaniel's claim must be rejected. 
Hargett, 598 F. Supp. at 154. 
The Hargett court went on to quote part of the 
floor debate which resulted in the amendment to Section 
78-14-4(2). At the floor debate prior to the third reading of 
H.B. 164, representative C. DeMont Judd stated: 
[W]e come to you now with the amendment 
which suggests that, despite what it says 
in 78-4, it does not impact 78-12 which is 
another area of the statute of limitations, 
and so we are making that change in order 
to overturn a Supreme Court decision which 
has recently come down. 
(Transcripts of discussion and vote in Utah House of 
Representatives at third reading of H.B. 164 
(February 13, 1979). 
It is clear that the Utah Legislature's intent was to 
put adults and infants on the same footing with respect to the 
statute of limitations. As stated in Hargett, "it is 
universally accepted that a legislature may put adults and 
infants on the same footing with respect to statutes of 
limitations without affecting constitutional rights." See, 
e.g., Petri v. Smith, 453 A.2d 342 (Pa.Super. 1982); De 
Santis v. Yaw, 434 A.2d 1273 (Pa.Super. 1981); 51 
Am.Jur.2d, Limitations of Action, Section 192 (1970). 
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It must be noted that the Supreme Court of Utah has 
recently rejected an attack based on the equal protection 
clause similar to that made by the appellant in this case. In 
Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, 635 P.2d 30 (Utah 1981), 
the court set forth the test to be applied in making the 
determination of whether a statute violates the equal 
protection clause: 
The test to be applied in making such a 
determination is whether there exists a 
rational basis to treat health care 
providers differently from otpher alleged 
tort-feasors. 
Id. at 31. 
The court further identified the general rule to be 
applied in examining equal protection challenges to a statute: 
As to discrimination: an act is never 
unconstitutional because of discrimination 
as long as there is some reasonable basis 
for differentiation between classes which 
is related to the purposes to be 
accomplished by the act. And it applies 
uniformly to all persons within the class. 
Id. at 31, citing Hanson v. Public Employees 
Retirement System, 246 P.2d 591 (Utah 1952). 
When the Supreme Court applied these rules, it found 
that: 
The Act (Utah Health Care Malpractice Act) 
was premised upon the need to protect and 
insure the continued availability of health 
care services to the public and not (as 
asserted by the plaintiff) to shield 
insurance companies from legitimate 
claims. The Legislature exercised its 
discretionary prerogative in determining 
that the shortening of the statute of 
limitations . . . would insure the 
continued availability of adequate health 
care services. In the absence of a showing 
to the contrary, we conclude that the 
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Legislature's determination is not so 
arbitrary or unreasonable as to exceed 
constitutional prohibitions. 
Id. at 32. 
In determining whether the questioned statute is 
unconstitutional, the proper test for the standard of review is 
the "rational basis test." Although appellants in this action 
argue that the "strict scrutiny" test or the "heightened 
scrutiny" test should be applied, the rational basis standard 
of review has been used by the Utah Supreme Court in all prior 
reviews of the medical malpractice statute of limitations. 
See, e.g., Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 
P.2d 30, 31 (Utah 1981) (cited in Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 
661, 670 (Utah 1984)). It is also the standard of review used 
by nearly all other state appellate courts which have reviewed 
the constitutionality of their own respective medical 
malpractice statutes. See American Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Community Hospital, 683 P.2d 670, 677 n.10 (Cal. 1984). 
(Citing 23 states and three federal circuits which have applied 
rational basis standard of review.) The "strict scrutiny" and 
"means-focus" standards of review that plaintiffs urge the 
court to adopt in this case are not applied to legislation 
which does not create a "suspect class" or affect a 
"fundamental constitutional right." Malan v. Lewis, 
supra, at 674, n.17. 
The same result was reached in Hargett v. 
Limburg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984), when the Honorable 
Judge David K. Winder stated that "unlike alienage, 
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illegitimacy or gender, the class of minors with medical 
malpractice claims does not involve a fundamental interest or a 
classification of a suspect character. Moreover, a minor's 
interest in redress for medical malpractice is not an interest 
of "basic importance" as is the interest in an education 
. . . ." Id. at 154. 
Accordingly, it is only necessary that the statute in 
question be rationally related to the stated purpose of the 
Legislature. The express purpose for the malpractice notice 
and limitation provisions is "to protect and insure the 
continued availability of health care services to the public." 
See Allen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.f 635 P.2d 30, 
32 (Utah 1981). The Legislature found an increasing trend in 
the number of medical malpractice claims and the amount of 
settlements and judgments. That trend was causing malpractice 
insurance premiums to increase to the extent that health care 
providers were encouraged to practice defensive medicine. The 
legislature also found that health care services were 
threatened by the possible unavailability of malpractice 
insurance. Consequently, the statute of limitations was 
enacted, "to provide a reasonable time in which actions might 
be commenced against health care providers while limiting the 
time to a specific period for which professional liability 
insurance premiums can be reasonably ahd accurately calculated 
• . ." Allen, 635 P.2d at 32. 
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As stated by Judge Winder in Hargett, 598 F. 
Supp. at 156, "containment of that perceived crisis is 
unquestionably a legitimate legislative objective." 
While appellants in this action would have this Court 
believe that the medical malpractice crisis never existed, such 
is not the case. The American Medical Association recently 
indicated that: 
There is a crisis in professional 
liability, it will get worse if 
comprehensive action is not taken . . . 
The huge continuing increases in premiums, 
suits and awards are significantly and 
adversely affecting the cost and 
availability of health care in the United 
States. (Emphasis added.) 
Responses of the AMA to the ATLA statements 
Regarding the Professional Liability Crisis, AMA 
Task Force on Professional Liability and Insurance 
(August 1985) . 
The medical malpractice crisis is particularly acute 
in specialized areas of medical practice. These specialists 
are being forced to restrict their services and reduce their 
high-risk case loads which ultimately reduces the quality and 
availability of health care. AMA Responses at 3. Across 
all specialties, three times as many claims are filed against 
physicians as were filed ten years ago. AMA, Socio 
Economic Monitoring Systems (1984): Malpractice, Balancing 
the Issues, Ambulatory Care, p. 9 (June, 1985). At least one 
in every ten doctors is sued each year. P. Danzon, The 
Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 1 
(1982). The situation in Utah is even worse: an average of 
thirty malpractice claims are presented each month. Utah 
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Department of Business Regulation Memorandum, Pre Litigation 
Medical Malpractice Review (October, 1985 - April, 1986). 
Accordingly, seventy percent of physicians now 
indicate that they have altered their practice of medicine to 
protect against lawsuits. AMA, Center for Health Policy 
Research, (April 1985). Current estimates indicate that 
medical costs related to professional liability, including the 
defense and medicine, accounted for twenty percent to 
seventy-five percent of the 69 billion dollars spent on 
physicians1 services in 1983. This amounts to 13.8 to 17.3 
billion dollars. National Health Expenditures, 1983; Health 
Care Financing and Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, Winter of 1984. 
Increases in malpractice awards also add to the already 
startling medical malpractice crisis. 
Furthermore, the extent of the current professional 
liability crisis is most accurately revealed by current data, 
indicating that average expenditures for professional liability 
insurance arose by 44.8% between 1982 and 1984. American 
Medical Association, Center for Health Policy Research, 
1985. The figure in Utah is significantly greater: two of the 
major Utah medical professional liability insurers more than 
doubled premium rates for physicians and surgeons between 1984 
and 1985. State of Utah Insurance Department Medical 
Professional Liability Insurance Premium Revision and State 
Paul Property and Liability Insurance Company Rate Increase 
Filings, (December 7, 1984 and December 10, 1985) (reflecting 
a 109.5% increase from 1984 to 1985; S|:ate of Utah Insurance 
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Department Medical Professional Liability Insurance Premium 
Rate Revision, UMIA Rate Increase Filings (January 27, 1984 
to December 26, 1985) (reflecting a 109% increase from 1984 to 
1985). 
The extraordinary liability crisis coupled with huge 
premium increases for physicians, is a problem effecting every 
physician and patient. In addressing this issue, the Kansas 
Supreme Court concluded: 
[L]ow-risk practitioners need high-risk 
specialists in order to provide 
comprehensive care for their patients. 
Were insurance coverage unavailable for the 
specialists in high-risk fields, the 
evidence indicates these professionals 
would either leave the state or would soon 
quit the practice, causing a general 
decline in overall quality of health care 
available. . . 
State Ex Rel Schneider v. Ligget, 576 P.2d 221, 229 (Kan. 
1978) . 
The existing insurance crisis will be exacerbated and 
the practice of specialized medicine might well become an 
uninsurable risk if the statute of limitations for medical 
malpractice actions is tolled on such claims until an infant 
reaches majority. 
As stated by Judge David K. Winder: 
Serious permanent injuries to children are 
often cases of large potential damages. If 
the period in which such claims could be 
brought were tolled until the young child 
reached the age of majority, a heavy burden 
would be placed on insurance carriers in 
evaluating and defending against the claim, 
establishing appropriate reserve 
requirements, and setting rates. The 
percentage of medical malpractice claims 
brought by minors is far from 
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insignificant. Moreover, the uncertainty 
inherent in tolling the period in which 
such claims may be brought could 
drastically affect insurance rates that 
least the segment of health care providers 
that provide services exclusively to 
minors. 
Weighing the needs to contain malpractice 
insurance costs and the need to insure the 
availability of health care service crisis 
against the competing interests of minors 
and mental incompetencies, the parent as 
guardian has failed to initiate an action, 
is particularly appropriate for the 
legislature, not the courts. The Utah 
legislature has done so and the statutory 
provision is reasonably related to 
accomplish a legitimate legislative 
purpose. The court therefore concludes 
that the classification at issue does not 
amount to a denial of equal protection. 
Hargett, 598 F. Supp. at 157. 
B. The malpractice statute of limitations 
does not unconstitutionally deprive minor plaintiffs 
of access to the courts. 
The appellants in this case have challenged the 
statute based on the open court's provision of the Utah 
Const. Art. I, Sec. 2. The plaintiffs in Hargett v. 
Limburg made an identical claim. The court in Hargett 
stated, however, that "that general isstue, however, is not 
raised by the facts of this case. Indeed, as discussed above, 
the plaintiff in this action discovered the alleged legal 
injury before the statute ran." Hargett, 598 F. Supp. 152, 
155 (D.Utah 1984). 
It is clear that the District Court for the district 
of Utah held that since the parents of the minor child knew of 
the injury prior to the time that the statute ran, the open 
court's provision of the Utah Constitution did not apply. Such 
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are the facts in the instant case. The appellants knew of the 
alleged negligence almost immediately after it occurred. Yet 
those same individuals would now bring a cause of action twelve 
years later based on the open court's provision. 
Similarly, the appellants strongly argue that now 
that their minor child has reached the age of majority, she 
should have the opportunity under the open court's provision of 
the Utah Constitution to bring an action in her own name. 
However, it is a fact that Jennifer Chapman is, and will 
continue to be mentally incompetent and therefore an action 
must be brought by and through her guardians Teresa and 
Robert Chapman. It is also a fact that Teresa and Robert 
Chapman are the same individuals that knew of the negligence 
prior to the time the statute ran. It is apparent, therefore, 
that the guardians of Jennifer Chapman, having missed the 
statute of limitations initially, are now attempting to take a 
second bite of the apple, even though substantively there is 
absolutely no difference between the individuals that should 
have brought the action initially, and those that are now 
attempting to bring the action. 
Finally, it has been concluded by the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah in Wheaton v. Jack, 
Civ. No. C-82-0039, Slip Op. (D. Utah August 9, 1982), that 
the statute in question does not violate the open court's 
provision. 
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CONCLUSION 
As discussed above, plaintiffs1 actions against 
defendant Myers fails for several reasons. First, 
plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendant Myers 
because the defendant was not involved in any of the acts which 
caused the harm to the plaintiff. Specifically, defendant 
Myers was not involved in either of the operations preceding 
Jennifer Chapman's coronary arrest, nor in the resuscitative 
efforts following that coronary arrest. The defendant's 
involvement began the day after the coronary arrest, and 
consequently, after the brain damage had been suffered by 
Jennifer Chapman. 
Second, it is clear from the testimony of Dr. Veasy 
that the plaintiffs were well aware of the alleged acts of 
negligence shortly after the negligent acts allegedly 
occurred. Therefore, it is clear that the plaintiffs had 
notice of the possibility of a lawsuit and cannot now claim 
that they were not aware of facts to support the possibility 
of a lawsuit. 
Third, although the plaintiffs allege that the 
defendant Myer acted fraudulently to conceal information the 
plaintiffs needed to know in order to initiate a lawsuit, the 
plaintiffs fail to even suggest one instance in which the 
defendant Myers said or did anything that could be construed to 
be a fraudulent concealment. 
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Finally, the plaintiffs allege that the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act and its accompanying statute of 
limitations violates constitutional rights of equal protection 
and access to the courts. It is clear, however, that under the 
"rational basis" standard of review, plaintiff's arguments must 
fail. 
Based on the above arguments, defendants-
respondents pray that this Court uphold the judgment of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, granting defendants1 motion for summary judgment and 
dismissal. 
DATED this /6 day of September, 1986. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
JL G A R r D . SfOTT 
GARY B. FERGUS ( 
MICHAEL L. SCHWAB 
Attorneys for Respondent Myer 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JENNIFER CHAPMAN, by and through 
her guardian, TERESA CHAPMAN, AND 
ROBERT CHAPMAN AND TERESA 
CHAPMAN, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
) 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT 
CHAPMAN 
Civil No. C85-6782 
) 
) (HON> H. F. WILKINSON) 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, et al., ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
STATE OF WYOMING 
COUNTY OF TETON 
) 
) ss 
) 
A - l 
Robert Chapman, being first duly sworn vnder oath deposes 
and savs: 
1. The contents of this affidavit are true except where stated 
upon information and belief and, as to such statements, I believe 
them to be true and I am competent to testify ^s to the matters and 
things set forth herein. 
2. I am one of the plaintiffs in the above entitled matter. My 
wife, Teresa, and I are the parents of Jennifer Chapman who was 
born on August 10, 1972. She is now 13 years old and is severely 
brain damaged. She will never walk or talk and is permanently and 
irreversible disabled, completely incompetent, and wholly dependent 
upon others for all of her bodily functions. 
3. During the first five months of her life, Jennifer experienced 
several blue spells for which she was taken to a hospital in Ogden, 
Utah for treatment. The doctors who had been treating her in Ogden 
had not been able to properly diagnose the problem and then sent 
her to Dr. Veasy at the Primary Children's Hospital for specialized 
care. Dr. Veasy diagnosed ihe illness as a heart problem which he 
attempted to cure with medication. After medication failed to cure 
the problem an operation was performed to install a device called a 
Waterston shunt. The first shunt did not function properly and on 
February 28, 1973, a second operation was performed to adjust the 
shunt . 
4. Jennifer recovered from the anesthesia and we were 
permitted to visit with her. I observed that Jennifer was crying and 
awake. After some 20 to 30 minutes had passed my wife returned 
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to visit her again and according to my wife she stayed in the room 
and talked to the nurses for some 15-20 minutes. During that time, 
according to my wife, a heart monitor machine attached to Jennifer 
had gone off and was sounding an alarm. The nurses in attendance 
told my wife that the alarm was caused by difficulties with the 
machine. My wife was in the room for 15-20 iminutes before the 
nurses noticed that Jennifer was having a coronary arrest. 
Emergenc} recussitative measures saved Jennifers life, but her brain 
was permanently damaged. 
5. My wife and I consulted with Dr. Veasy and representatives 
of the Hospital. During one of our meetings in 1982, Scott Olsen, 
representing defendant Scott Wetzel an affiliate of the Home Group 
was present. ¥l&wt this meeting Dr. Veasv represented to my wife 
A 
and I that there were tests and records which indicated that the 
cause of our daughter's injuries was a blood clot or shower of blood 
clots that flooded her brain, and that he "knew fbr a fact" that the 
blood clots had caused her injur), that this evejnt was unavoidable 
and could have nothing to do with any negligence on the part of 
anyone. On the date of the,meeting Scott Olsen kdvised me that Dr. 
Veasy and Dr. Meyers were "much too professional to cover anything 
up1' concering the cause of Jennifers injuries. Following the meeting 
defendant Wetzel forwarded a letter to us which stated that their 
review of the case had shown that the cause of Jennifers' injuries 
was a blood clot which entered Jennifers brain and that her injuries 
were unrelated to anything which had been done by the Hospital. 
Apparently by accident, we received not only th£ letter which was 
intended for us but a copy of the letter which was intended for the 
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Hospitals' administrator, Charles Done, as well. That letter contained 
a written note which said "Charles; this should get the Chapmans' off 
your back — if they call you please refer them t]o me". I confronted 
Mr. Done with the letter and he told me that he was "embarrassed" 
by it but did not deny that Wetzel had wrritten it or that Wetzel was 
authorized to write it. 
6. We trusted and believed the defendants (including the 
statements made by Wetzel-Home Group) and believed that Jennifers 
injuries were due to blood clots and were unavoidable, until the 
summer of 1984. when we received medical records of the Hospital 
which related to Jennifer's injuries. Contrary to the statements of the 
defendants, I discovered that the medical records did not contain any 
test results which would indicate the true cause of Jennifer's injuries 
and they showed uncertainty as to the cause of the injuries. These 
records were therefore in direct conflict with the aforesaid 
statements of the defendants to us. 
7. Upon receiving the medical records in July of 1984 and after 
talking to Dr. Veasy, I suspected that we had been deceived. 
Therefore, we sought a second medical opinion. lit was not until 
January of 1985 that we finally discovered that the defendants had 
not given us full disclosure of the true cause of Jennifer's injuries and 
very likely had misrepresented that to us. At that time I discovered 
that the cause of her injuries was probably not related to blood clots 
and that the injuries were caused by a lack of oxygen which occurred 
during the Hospital's delay in providing rescusitative care to her. 
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8. As a result of the statements of the defendants, including 
defendants Wetzel-Home Group we delayed in filing a claim against 
the Hospital and in bringing this action. 
DATED this jk day of May, 1986. 
Robert Chapman 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this / j day bf May, 1986. 
) / 
Notary Publict 
My commission expires: 
- ~ ft (1 
A - 5 
on, McCenkl* 
t BtMhncIl 
•MBOIWI CoTnrawn 
0 S 300 EAST 
U.T LAKE CITY 
UTAHWtn 
B. Lloyd Poelman - A2617 
David B. Erickson - A3788 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JENNIFER CHAPMAN, by and through 
her guardian, TERESA CHAPMAN, 
ROBERT CHAPMAN AND TERESA 
CHAPMAN, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, a 
hospital organized to do business 
in the State of Utah; PRIMARY 
CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER, a 
hospital organized to do business 
in the State of Utah; INTERMOUNTAIN 
HEALTH CARE, a Utah corporation dba 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL; IHC 
HOSPITALS, INC., a Utah corporation 
dba PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL; 
THE HEALTH SERVICES CORPORATION 
OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a former or 
present Utah corporation dba 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL; GARTH 
MEYERS, M.D.; L. GEORGE VEASY, M.D., 
KAREN BOWMAN, R.N.; SCOTT WETZEL 
COMPANY a Utah corporation; THE 
HOME GROUP, INC., a foreign 
corporation; JOHN DOE I-X; and 
BLACK CORPORATIONS I-V, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
L. GEORGE VEASY, M.D. 
Civil No. C85-6782 
jHON. HOMER F. WILKINSON) 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The undersigned L. George Veasy, being first duly sworn 
under oath deposes and says: 
1. I am a defendant in the abpve-entitled matter. I 
am a licensed physician and surgeon under the laws of the State 
of Utah. 
2. In February 1973, on refertal from another doctor, 
I was the admitting physician in connection with the hospitaliza-
tion of Jennifer Chapman at Primary Children's Medical Center, 
although I did not perform the two heart surgeries she underwent 
during that admission. Approximately six hours following her 
second surgery Jennifer Chapman experienced a generalized seizure 
(convulsion) following which her heart stopped (cardiac 
arrest). This episode left Jennifer Chapman immediately and 
severely handicapped with both physical and mental impairments 
for which she has been under continuous medical supervision and 
care to this date. 
3. In the months and years immediately following the 
episode in February 1973 that left her impaired, I have had many 
discussions and considerable correspondence with Teresa Chapman 
and Robert Chapman, parents of Jennifer Chapman. On several 
occasions they have alleged that medical negligence during her 
hospitalization at Primary Children's Medical Center in February 
1973 caused Jennifer's impaired condition. 
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4. As an example and as evidence of such allegations 
made by the Chapmans, I attach hereto as Exhibit "A" a copy of an 
undated, hand-written letter from Robert Chapman to me which I 
received sometime prior to May 2, 1977. [For convenience, a 
typed copy of said letter, without spelling or gramatical 
corrections, is also attached.] 
5. Frequently since 1973 I have participated in 
providing or coordinating medical care fbr Jennifer Chapman at 
the request of her parents Robert Chapman and Teresa Chapman. 
Based on my personal conversations and cbrrespondence with Teresa 
and Robert Chapman, I know and state that continuously since 1973 
they have believed, albeit erroneously, that the episode which 
Jennifer Chapman experienced at Primary Children1s Medical Center 
in February 1973 was preventable and resulted from medical 
negligence by those who attended her. 
6. I am informed and believe that plaintiffs have 
consulted with various attorneys concerning what they believed to 
be a claim for medical negligence against one or more of the 
defendants named above including, but probably not limited to, 
the following attorneys: 
Richard D. Burbidge, Esq. November 1977 
22 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. January 1979 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
[an additional Salt Lake City 1979 or 1980 
attorney whose name is not 
presently recalled] 
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Jack C. Helgesen, Esq. October 1984 
HELGESEN & WATERFALL, P.C. 
2650 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Fred R. Silvester, Esq. July 1985 
BLACK & MOORE 
261 East Broaday 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kathryn Collard November 1985 
Attorney at Law 
401 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Plus co-counsel from Wyoming November 1985 
7. I do not believe there are any significant matters 
learned by plaintiffs in July 1984 concerning the allegations in 
the complaint herein that were not known to plaintiffs in 1977 or 
which were not then readily discoverable by them through acting 
with reasonable diligence on their strongly held belief that 
Jennifer was injured by medical negligence in 1973. 
8. I declare the foregoing matters to be true of my 
own knowledge except as to matters set ^orth upon information and 
belief, and as to such matters I believe them to be true. 
L.XjGeorgd Vg£6y, M. D . ^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 7 ^ day of 
December, 1985. 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAltlNG 
This is to certify that I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF L. GEORGE VEASY, M.D., by 
depositing th$ same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
on this the / ? ^ day of December, 1985 to the following: 
Kathryn Collard, Esq. 
401 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
P. Richard Meyer, Esq. 
Robert N. Williams, Esq. 
P. 0. Box 2608 
Jackson, Wyoming 83001 
Gary B. Ferguson, Esq. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
P. 0. BOX 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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[Typed copy of Exhibit "A"] 
Dr. George Veasy 
Primary Childrens Hospital 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Dr. Veasy: 
Some time ago I sat in your office and asked that you advise 
me and help me to make a decission concerning a malpractice suite 
in Jennifers behalf. Since that meeting I have given daily 
thought and prayer as to which dirrection I should go in 
providing Jennifer with security for the time she will be here on 
earth. I am writing this letter so that you will have a better 
understanding of our situation and why I am making the decision 
that I am. 
First of all in our meeting you seemed more concerned about 
what our atorney would bennifit from the case rather than what 
Jennifer could obtain. We sat and talked tor probably an hour 
and a half and never once did you ask how Jennifer was doing. 
You refered only to those damn lawers and the blood money that I 
was seeking. I have pondered this in my hart daily sience that 
meeting. I was raised in a religious home and taught honesty and 
respect for working to obtain what we have* Our profit has 
warned us against accepting filthy lucre and that money in of 
itself is not evil but the honesty and (undecipherable) in which 
we obtain it is the important fact. 
I would at this time like to assure yOu that obtaining 
filthy lucre or blood money as you have called it is not my 
intention. I am not seeking to destroy any doctors or put a 
hospital out of business. Insurance premiums our paid to protect 
us all against hardship in this world. I have to insure my 
business against fire, theftf and accident to protect me as a 
business man. It is not something that only doctors pay. 
What has brought me to the decision t0 go ahead with the 
suite are two events that have happened in our lives and I would 
like to explain them to you so you can understand our feelings. 
First of all in our home we have living with us an uncle who 
is mentally handicaped. We live with him to take care of his 
needs and try to bring him some sort of happiness in this life. 
We have now found it necessary to move aft^r five years of caring 
for this man. We find that the cost of housing is increasing so 
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rapidly and our family is growing to quickly that we have no 
alternative but to get into our own home. In the nearly five 
years we have been here not one relative has offered to help us 
with this burden. We have become the center of jealousy and back 
biting among religious people. Now that we are building our own 
home it seems that no one wants the responsibility of caring for 
Uncle Lynn. The fighting and accusing is already taking place. 
It looks as though I might have to build 4n extra room in our 
basement to let him live in because no on^ wants him. I can not 
in good conciance after what has happened here in the last five 
years leave Jennifer as a burden to someories family if something 
should happen to Teresa or I before she ig gone. The burdens and 
responsibilities have been tremendous. 
On Feb. 24th of this year my wife anc| our five children were 
driving to pick me up from work when an Iriternational Scout went 
out of control and ran into the back of our car. At this point 
there were some minor injuries but everyone seemed to be okay. 
Because of the impact the doors were jamedl 
out of the car. While they were waiting for help a semi truck 
and they could not get 
em again knocking them 
and completely 
(arrived they found my 
and trailer went out of control and hit th|( 
a hundred and fifty feet down the highway 
demolishing our vehicle. When the police 
wife unconcious in the back seat of the car and my eight year old 
boy administering first aid to Jennifer and our baby Cory. The 
entire family had to be taken to the hospital and treated. 
Teresa, Jennifer and Cory were admitted because of their 
injuries. They were there for a period of five days before being 
released. While they were there the nursep found it so difficult 
to care for Jennifer that in five days theV fed her exactly 1/2 
of one meal. That 1/2 of a meal took a nurse over 1-1/2 hours to 
get down her. The rest of the meals were fed to her buy me. I 
had to close up my business to care for heir. I takes a 
tremendous amount of paciance to care for her and I can't leave 
her to die in the hands of people who don't care for her and love 
her the way we do. Because of the accident I realize how close I 
came to losing my wife and children. Had Teresa been killed 
Jennifer would have been left in this worl$ without the ability 
to care for herself and it would be just a matter of time before 
she would be back to the stage we brought her home from the 
hospital in four years ago as doctor Myer put it, a vegetable. 
Now I am well aware that I am not qualified medically or 
legally to answer all the questions pertaiiiing to a malpractice 
suite. The way I understand the law the burden of proof is on me 
to prove both negligence and physical damage. The negligence is 
obvious but to what extent the physical damage can be linked to 
this negligence only a man of your medical knowledge can know for 
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sure. I do know that besides being mentally and physically 
handicaped Jennifer also has an enlarged heart making it 
impossible for her to ever lead any kind of normal active life 
and eventually will be the cause of her death. She was hurt and 
hurt bad because of wrong decisions made in her early life. The 
laws in the state of Utah allow for compensation for pain and 
suffering. She suffered and felt pain fot the first five months 
of her life only to be turned away by doctors that didn't have 
time for little girls that could hold the^r breath. She felt 
death in her soul at least twice a month and fought for her very 
life only to have it completely destroyed. You told me if she 
had died you would have been obligated to testify in her 
behalf. A dead person feels no pain and suffering. She is 
entitled to security for as long as she is willing to go on 
struggling for her life. This case has to be weighed upon its 
individual merits and not by what it costs for insurance for each 
bed in a hopsital. I reemphasize that I am not seeking to 
destroy anyone or collect a fortune in blopd money. The help 
provided by the state and federal governments to the handicapped 
are a mockery to the society we live in. They only provide 
administrative moneys and do nothing for tpe individual 
patient. I can no longer depend on other people to care for my 
daughter. She is only loved in our home ahd the financial burden 
is to great for me to bare alone. I don't know what Jennifers 
future will bring but as her father I beg you to consider 
Jennifer as an individual and not an insur&nce burden to each bed 
in each hospital. Before too long my atorney will be in contact 
with you and I ask that you realize that h0 represents Jennifers 
interests and set aside your feeling toward the legal 
profession. It is imparative that we have honest factual 
answers. 
I do hope that we can continue through life as the best of 
friends and that I can alway intrust Jennifers life in your very 
capable hands. 
Sincerely, 
Robert Chapitian 
P . S . Thanks for your t ime . 
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Ms. Kathryn Collard 
Attorney at Law 
401 Boston Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
(801) 534-1664 
P. Richard Meyer 
Robert N. Williams 
Attorneys at law 
165 West Pearl 
Jackson, Wyoming 
(307) 733-5300 
Attorneys for Plaint 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JENNIFER CHAPMAN, by and through ! 
her guardian, TERESA CHAPMAN, AND 
ROBERT CHAPMAN AND TERESA ) 
CHAPMAN, individually, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. I 
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, et al., ] 
Defendants. ! 
AFFADAVIT OF TERESA 
) CHAPMAN 
) Civil No. C85-6782 
) (HPN. H. F. WILKINSON) 
84111 
JRHZQ 12 07 PH'88 
,1 m.ot i ips- j iac iuRR 
83001 
tiffs 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF ) 
The undersigned Teresa Chapman, being first duly sworn 
under oath deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the plaintiffs in the above titled matter. I am 
competent to testify to the matters and things set forth in this 
affidavit and things are true except those things which are set forth 
on my information and belief and, as to those things, I believe them 
to be true. 
2. My husband, Robert, I and are the parents of Jennifer 
Chapman. She was born on August 10, 1972, and is now 13 years 
old. Jennifer is severely brain damaged. She will never walk, or talk, 
and is permanently disabled. She is completely incompetent, and 
wholly dependent on others for all of her bodily functions. 
3. Jennifer, who seemed otherwise normal to us experienced 
several^ blue spells in the first five months of her life. My husband 
and I took her to some doctors in Ogden, Utah for treatment of these 
blue spells. Those doctors failed to completly diagnose her condition 
and they referred us to Dr. Veasy at the Primary Children's Hospital 
for specialized treatment. 
4. Dr. Veasy diagnosed the illness as a heart problem which he 
attempted to stabilize with medication u&til an operation could be 
performed. An operation was subsequently performed to install a 
device called a Waterston shunt. The first shunt did not function 
properly and on February 28, 1973, a second operation was 
performed to adjust the shunt. 
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5. After the second operation, Jennifer recovered from the 
anesthetic and we were permitted to visit her. She was crying and 
awake when my husband and I left the room. 
6. About 10 to 15 minutes after leaving Jennifer's room, I 
returned to visit her again. Several nurses were in the room. Jennifer 
looked peculiar to me but I believed the nurses were on top of the 
situation since they were standing with me by her beside observing 
her. One of the nurses was working with the heart monitoring 
machine which was attached to Jennifer. The elntire time I was in 
the room the nurse kept fidgeting with the electrode leads on 
Jennifers chest. After 10-15 minutes had passed, the nurse told me 
that an alarm on the heart monitor machine wks sounding. She told 
me that the machine would not set properly and that she would have 
to get someone to help her set it. Before she lelft the room I asked 
her whether the anesthetic was making Jennifer look peculiar. She 
then examined Jennifer and told me that Jennifer was in cardiac 
arrest. At that point, she signaled for help and other doctors and 
nurses arrived shortly. Emergency recussitative measures saved 
Jennifer's life, but she became permanantly brftin damaged. 
7. My husband and I consulted with our physician, Dr. Veasy, 
in whom we had great trust, to see if he thought there had been 
negligence on the part of the doctors in Ogden f<j>r failing to send our 
daughter to him sooner. I believed that Dr. Veajsy, the Head of 
Cardiology at the defendant Hospital, spoke for the Hospital as well 
as himself during our meetings with him. He Represented to my 
husband and I that there were tests and record^ which indicated that 
the cause of our daughter's injuries was a blood clot or shower of 
blood clots that flooded her brain and that he "knew for a fact" that 
the blood clots had caused her injury. In addition, he said that this 
event was unavoidable and had nothing to do with any negligence on 
the part of anyone. 
8. Soon after Jennifer received her brain damage we filed suit 
against the Ogden doctors who had treated Jennifer for the blue 
spells she had experienced during the first five months of her life. 
We claimed that the Ogden physicians had waited too long to send 
Jennifer to Dr. Veasy for specialized care. Dr. Veasy was critical of 
the delay on the part of the Ogden doctors in sending Jennifer to him 
for care, but he persuaded us and our lawyers that he knew for a 
fact" that Jennifer's brain damage was due to blood clots, that it was 
unavoidable and unrelated to anyone's misconduct. He 
recommended dismissal of the suit. Based upon Dr. Veasy's 
statements we dismissed the suit against the Ogden physicians. At 
that time and at all times up until July, 1954, we believed and 
trusted Dr. Veasy and relied upon the statements he made to us. 
9. After the dismissal of the Ogden case the defendants Veasy, 
Meyers and the Hospital continued to provide treatment to Jennifer 
and they continued to represent to us that the medical records and 
tests showed that the cause of her injuries were blood clots and that 
it was unavoidable and that any omission on the part of anyone 
caused Jennifer's brain damage. No one associated with any of the 
defendants ever told me that the nurse's statements to me, that the 
heart monitor was functioning incorrectly, were false. 
10. We trusted and believed the defendants until the July of 
1984, when we received medical records of the Hospital which 
related to Jennifer's injuries. Contrary to the statements of the 
defendants, we discovered that the medical records did not contain 
any tests results which would indicate the true cause of Jennifer's 
injuries. In fact they showed uncertainty as to the cause of the 
injuries. These records were therefore in direct conflict with the 
statments of Dr. Veasy to us. 
11. In July of 1964, my husband and II confronted Dr. Veasy 
about the medical records and their conflict v i^th his previous 
statements to us. He replied that the true cause of Jennifer's injuries 
had never been established and he admitted that his prior 
statements to us on this subject were assumptions on his part and 
not the result of tests which had been performed on Jennifer. 
12. Upon receiving the medical records jn July of 1964 and 
after talking to Dr. Veasy, I suspected that we had been deceived. 
Therefore, we sought a second medical opinion. It was not until 
January of 1965 that we finally discovered that Dr. Veasy and the 
other medical defendants had not given us full disclosure of the true 
cause of Jennifer's injuries. At that time, we discovered that the 
cause of her injuries was probably not related to blood clots and that 
the injuries were probably caused by a lack, oi oxygen which 
occurred during the Hospital's delay in providing rescusitative care 
to her. 
12. Since February 26, 1973, we and Jennifer maintained a 
continuing doctor-patient relationship with Dr. Veasy and the 
Hospital until approximately March or April 1^65 and Jennifer 
received ongoing care from them. The doctor-patient relationship 
between us and Dr. Meyers existed until approximately June, 1963. 
During these periods Jennifer received treatment for her brain 
damaged condition and its complications from all of these 
defendants . 
Dated this 16th day of January, 1986. 
Teresa Chapman 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day of January, 1986. 
Notary Public 
My commission expires: 
